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ABSTRACT
Perceptual Encoding and the Stimulus Probability Effect
(September, 1982)
Randall S. Hansen, B.S., University of Illinois
M.S., University of Massachusetts
Directed by: Professor Arnold D. Well
Three experiments were conducted to investigate the effect of
stimulus probability on perceptual encoding. In Experiment 1, the
role of an abstract code as a mediator of the effect was tested.
Subjects viewed and responded to stimuli in conditions which either
encouraged or discouraged the use of abstract codes. Contrary to
prediction, the effect of probability tended to be greater at a low
level of stimulus contrast when the use of abstract codes was dis-
couraged, and unaffected by contrast when their use was encouraged.
Subjects 1 responses to a questionnaire indicated that the use of
abstract codes was determined to some extent by individual strate-
gies. It was proposed that it is unnecessary to appeal to an
abstract code that differs from a name code as a mediator of the
probability effect at encoding. In Experiments 2 and 3, the degree
to which the probability effect at encoding may be explained by
sequential expectancy effects was examined. The probability effect
was greater at low contrast in Experiment 2, and the results of
Experiment 3 indicated a similar trend. The magnitude of the con-
trast effect did not vary as a function of the preceding stimulus
sequence in either experiment. Previous results have shown that the
size of the contrast effect does not depend on whether or not the
ensuing stimulus is preceded by a valid cue. These findings were
interpreted as suggesting that the probability effect at encoding is
the result of a relatively static mechanism in which expectancies do
not shift over trials.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The assertion that the acquisition of information may be guided
by preexisting knowledge and other nonstimulus factors is a common one.
It is the basis for the top-down/bottom-up distinction, and has been
invoked in models of information processing that run the gamut from per
ception to word recognition to comprehension (e.g., Becker and Killion,
1977; Kintsch and van Dijk, 1978; Meyer, Schvaneveldt
, and Ruddy, 1975;
Minsky, 1975; Morton, 1969). The present study is an attempt to expli-
cate the mechanism by which nonstimulus factors influence perceptual
encoding. Perceptual encoding is defined here as the set of processes
including and temporally preceding the identification of a stimulus.
For ease of reference, nonstimulus factors that potentially influ-
ence the perceptual encoding process will be termed "cognitive" vari-
ables. The use of this label is not meant to imply anything about the
degree to which these factors may be under the subject's conscious con-
trol. This remains an empirical question. Some examples of cognitive
variables are psychological factors such as expectancy and incentive
(or motivation), and experimentally induced factors such as adjustment
to task instructions, stimulus repetition, and in particular, stimulus
probability. It will ultimately be desirable to assess the effects of
each of these variables in turn with respect to a model of encoding
mechanisms. Initially, though, I have selected stimulus probability
as the cognitive variable of interest, with the goal of establishing
1
a general model of the functioning of cognitive factors based on the
results obtained via this variable.
The Stimulus Probability Effect and Its Loci
Stimulus probability is defined as the relative frequency with
which a given stimulus is presented during a task. Two common ways of
manipulating probability have been to vary the number of equally prob-
able stimuli and to vary the presentation probabilities of each stimu-
lus. Hyman (1953) used both of these manipulations in demonstrating
that reaction time (RT) is a linear function of the amount of informa-
tion per stimulus presentation. He found that RT increased with
decreasing stimulus probability.
Although in typical manipulations of stimulus probability the
effect builds up over trials, effects due to instructions stating
stimulus probabilities have also been observed. For example, Bartz
(1971) varied the number of equiprobable stimuli and informed subjects
of the size of the stimulus set beforehand. When RTs on the first trial
were analyzed, results showed the same relationship of RT to amount of
information as Hyman found. This suggests that the prior expectancy of
the subject, as well as experience in the task, may contribute to the
probability effect. This possibility will only be mentioned here, but
is worth noting with respect to the potential involvement of conscious
control in the mechanism underlying the probability effect.
A good deal of past research has been concerned with establishing
the locus of the probability effect. As a result, there have been two
major classes of explanation regarding the effect. One of these main-
tains that .nor, probable sU,„„li are identilied faster; Lb, other states
that probability has its effect at the stage of response retrieval. One
paradigm that has been nsed extensively in attempting to decide tbe
issue is that of Laberge ;,,„! Tweedy (1964). Three or more stimuli are
assigned to two responses in order to compare RTs to stimuli that differ
in presentation probability but require tbe same response, and to com-
pare KTs to stimuli that share the same presentation probability, but
require responses associated with different probabilities. It is
assumed that RT differences of the lirst type implicate a perceptual
locus of the probability effect, wh i I e differences of tin- second type
suggest an effect at the response decision stage. Results of studies
Uiing this paradigm have been mixed, with some studies .suggesting thai
mote prQb«bla stimuli are identified Lister, others that response pro-
cesses are primarily affected, and still others which sugges t that the
probability effect is composed ol both perceptual and response compo-
nents (e.g., Dillon, 1 966 ; Hawkins, Thomas, and Drury, 1970; LaHerge,
hegi and
,
and llobb ie
,
I ')(.<) ) .
I" addition to the obvious difficulty ol interpretation in the lace
ol these conflicting results, il should be noted that the logic which
implicates a perceptual LOCUS loi the probability effect based on RT
differences to unequally probable stimuli with the same response is no I
necessarily valid. The i os and his co-workers (Theios, !')/'>; Theios,
Smith i Haviland, Traupman, and Moy f i')/j) proposed a mechanism based
on the re t r i eva I o 1 appropriate s f i mu I us - response ( S-K ) ma pp i ngs wh i < li
seems equally plausible, but won I d localize probability e f f ec ts < > I this
nature it i response selection stage ol processing. The mechanism i
s
assumed to be comprised of a dynamic memory stack of stimulus repre-
sentations paired with their responses. The stack is searched in a
serial manner until a match with the presented stimulus is found, and
ordering in the stack is based on frequency and recency of S-R occur-
rences
A second approach that has been utilized in determining the locus
of the stimulus probability effect relies on the additive factors
methodology of Sternberg (1969). The notion is that if the magnitude
of the probability effect varies depending on the level of a variable
known to affect only a given stage of processing, then it may be con-
cluded that probability has at least some of its effect on that stage.
Two caveats must be heeded concerning this approach: (1) The finding
that probability interacts with a factor known to affect one stage of
processing does not preclude the possibility that probability may also
affect another stage, and (2) care must be taken in interpreting addi-
tivity, as illustrated by Taylor (1976). To use one of his examples,
a stage labelled "stimulus encoding" may in fact be composed of several
substages. It is possible that two factors may affect two different
substages, thus failing to interact. The typical conclusion would be
that at least one of the factors does not influence encoding. A more
reasonable conclusion might be that the encoding "stage" actually
involves two stages.
Miller and Pachella (1973) conducted a study which illustrates the
use of the additive factors methodology in localizing the probability
effect. They manipulated stimulus probability and stimulus quality in a
naming task and a memory scanning task requiring a button-press response
Stilus quality was manipulated by varying the contrast, or intensity,
of visually presented digits. They found that the magnitude of the
probability effect increased with decreasing stimulus quality in both
tasks. Based on the assumption that stimulus quality affects encoding
but not response processing, their conclusion was that stimulus probabil-
ity has an effect at the encoding stage. (I will discuss this assump-
tion later on.) This interaction of stimulus contrast and probability
has been reported a number of times in the literature (e.g., Miller,
1979; Miller and Pachella, 1976; Stanovich and Pachella, 1977).
The additive factors method has also been used to yield results
that suggest a response locus of the probability effect. Hawkins,
MacKay, Holley, Friedin, and Cohen (1973) manipulated S-R compatibility
along with stimulus and response probability in the LaBerge and Tweedy
(1964) paradigm. Compatibility was manipulated by asking subjects to
verbally respond to visually presented letters with their correct names
in the high-compatible condition, and with names of different predesig-
nated letters in the low-compatible condition. Two stimuli were mapped
to one response in the task by using as stimuli both upper- and lower-
case versions of letters of the same name. It was assumed that S-R
compatibility is a variable which affects response processes, but not
encoding. Hawkins and his co-workers found that the size of the response
probability effect (the difference in RTs to equiprobable stimuli
associated with responses of unequal probabilities) increased with
decreasing S-R compatibility, indicating that both factors operate on
the same (response) stage. In addition, they found that the probability
effect resulting from the comparison of RTs to the unequally probable
stimuli sharing the same response was also affected by varying S-R
compatibility. That is, the "stimulus" probability effect was larger
in the low-compatible condition. This result was interpreted as imply-
ing that probability does not have any effect on encoding.
The preceding conclusion may be invalid for at least two reasons.
First, Hawkins and his associates have implicitly assumed that the
"stimulus" probability manipulation may affect either an encoding or a
response stage, but not both. In other words, they have ignored the
possibility that probability may affect both stages. In order to make
a more legitimate claim, they might have also varied contrast in order
to provide the opportunity of observing an interaction that would impli
cate an encoding locus. Second, it was assumed that mechanisms under-
lying the probability effect are the same regardless of the nature of
stimuli or task. This may be a faulty assumption. Using a memory scan
ning task, Miller and Pachella (1976) found that stimulus probability
interacted with contrast when the stimuli were digits, but not when the
stimulus set consisted of nonsense figures. They concluded that proba-
bility affects the process of naming the stimulus, since names are
readily available to the subject for digits, but not nonsense figures.
Miller and Pachella also observed a sizeable probability effect for the
nonsense figures, which suggests that a response locus for the effect
exists along with the encoding locus suggested by the contrast by
probability interaction.
In the study by Hawkins and his colleagues, letter stimuli were
responded to with their appropriate names in the high-compatible condi-
tion, but with names of other letters in the low-compatible condition.
Whereas subjects in the former condition could easily utilize a name in
executing their responses, this would be mUch more difficult for sub-
jects in the latter condition. In fact, the readily available name of
the stimulus should actually interfere with the correct response in this
condxtxon. In light of the Miller and Pachella (1976) results, it seems
likely that processing in the two conditions was fundamentally differ-
ent. If this were the case, a more accurate interpretation of the
results of the study by Hawkins and his co-workers would be that the
mechanism underlying the probability effect at the response stage is
also affected by S-R compatibility, while the mechanism at the encoding
stage is not. Their observation of the compatibility by probability
interaction then follows directly.
If this interpretation is correct, there should be a probability
main effect for those stimuli in the high-compatible condition that
shared the same response, but appeared with unequal frequencies. This
main effect was not observed. However, Miller and Pachella (1973) did
observe a significant main effect of probability with an absolute mean
difference of roughly the same magnitude (15-20 milliseconds) as was
present in the study of Hawkins and his colleagues. The latter employed
relatively few trials with their subjects (240 versus 800 in Miller and
Pachella, 1973). If, indeed, the probability effect is one which builds
over trials, it may be that subjects did not undergo enough trials for
the effect to sufficiently build up. In support of this interpretation,
the advantage of high- versus low-probability stimuli in the Hawkins
et al. study increases over blocks. Finally, there is some evidence of
a speed-accuracy trade-off, with low-probability items showing a larger
8error rate. This could have reduced the probability effect in the RT
data
.
On the basis of the results reviewed up to this point, it seems
reasonable to think that stimulus probability may have its effect at both
encoding and response stages of processing. Most of the studies that 1
have mentioned have been primarily concerned with establishing the locus
of the effect, and to a lesser extent (if at all) with specifyiug the
mechanism involved. As previously mentioned, the description of the
mechanism underlying the probability effect, particularly with regard
to encoding, is the primary objective of this project. Accordingly,
several studies will now be reviewed which represent attempts to des-
cribe this mechanism, or to at least predict when probab i I i t y will
a I I eel encod i ng
,
and when i I will not .
Assumption Localizing the Effect of Contrast at Encoding
Before considering the research related to the effects of stimulus
probability on encoding, 1 will discuss the assumption which localizes
the effect of contrast manipulation at the encoding stage of processing.
Tin:; assumption is crit i < i I in ill <>l th« studies t li.it have employed
t he add i I Lve Factors mo t hod< > I <>p,y in < 's t .1 b I i Ii i n an encoding LOCUI 0 J
the probability effect. For this reason, it is important that there
ox 1 I :; some* ov i (Ionic in .support o I this i I a i 111
.
The as sump t ion that contrast a M ec t s on cod i n>> t :; COIlliatenl with
findings I rom the Literature on visual mas king F< > » example ( SchJ 1 Lei
( 1 965 ) 1 ound that .1 I i gh t (lash of fee t ively ma sks a i o 1m 1 i presented
monocu I a r
I y , hut not when presented dichoptically [n the 1 1 1 s t case
,
target and .ask presumably travel via the same peripheral pathway, per-
mitting the .ask to have its effect at an early level of processing.
The convergence of the two is .ore central in the dichoptic condition,
however. A light flash may be thought of as reducing the contrast of
the stimulus, and peripheral processing may be considered to occur ear-
lier than central processing. Furthermore, Turvey (1973) and Schiller
found that a pattern mask is effective in dichoptic presentation, thus
ruling out the possibility that stimuli presented in this manner are
simply immune to masking.
Pachella and Fisher (1969) found that asmyptotic performance in a
discrimination task was unaffected by luminance level, but was lowered
by increasing stimulus similarity. This supports the claim that the
effect of contrast is on the rate of information accrual, rather than on
the product of the identification process.
Finally, Hardzinski and Pachella (1980) used a memory scanning
task with alphabetic stimuli, and asked subjects to respond on the basis
of either a physical or name match. Subjects were presented with memory
sets of various sizes, which were comprised of upper- and lowercase ver-
sions of a letter in the name match condition, letters of the same case
in a control condition, and single versions of letters of either case in
the physical match condition. Stimulus contrast was also manipulated.
Only the scanning rate in the physical match condition was affected by
contrast, and this result could not be replicated in a second experi-
ment. Hardzinski and Pachella interpreted these results as indicating
that an abstract internal representation is obtained from which the
effects of the contrast manipulation have been removed. It is this
10
representation that is used for comparison in the memory scanning stage.
The effect of stimulus contrast can thus be presumed to have a locus
before the memory scanning stage (hence before a response stage), namely,
at an encoding stage. The aforementioned results of studies in which
stimulus contrast was manipulated suggest that the assumption localizing
the effect at encoding is a reasonable one.
The Probability Effect and Its Potential Causes
This section is divided into two subsections. The rationale for
this division may be understood if the effect of probability is analyzed
in terms of a state in the subject which somehow arises due to the
probability manipulation, and the causes of this state. However it
arises, once there, the state manifests itself in some way in the pro-
cessing of a stimulus. The studies and models discussed in the first
subsection address the manner in which this (the probability effect)
occurs. In contrast, the studies reviewed in the second subsection
concern themselves with how the subject comes to be in a certain state
at a given point in time. In other words, how does the manipulation of
probability produce varying states in the subject such that their
effects on processing may be observed?
Mechanisms of the probability effect . As already mentioned, Miller
and Pachella (1976) observed additivity between probability and con-
trast when nonsense stimuli were used, but not for digits. The con-
clusion was that probability has some of its effect upon a stimulus
identification stage. In an attempt to corroborate this conclusion,
11
Pachella and Miller (1976) manipulated stilus probability and contrast
in a letter matching task (Posner and Mitchell, 1967). Under name iden-
tity instructions, Pachella and Miller observed a probability effect
on name match and different trials, but not on physical match trials.
They reasoned that on physical match trials, a relatively fast response
could be made on the basis of physical identity alone, and this response
would not have to involve a naming process. If the stimuli are not
physically identical, however, a naming process would presumably be
involved. The finding of a probability effect for only those trials
that required the naming of the stimulus suggests that probability has
an effect on stimulus identification. In further support of this con-
clusion, Pachella and Miller failed to observe a probability effect for
any trial type (physical match, name match but different case, or dif-
ferent) when responses were made on the basis of physical identity.
A troublesome aspect of the Pachella and Miller study is the fail-
ure to observe a contrast by probability interaction for the trials in
which stimulus identification should have been involved. They suggested
that the effect of degradation may have been removed by the early physi-
cal comparison process as a result of testing for physical identity.
However, this suggestion leads to the prediction of an additive rela-
tionship between contrast and trial type. While this interaction was
not significant at a conventional level, there was a strong indication
that the effect might have been present. Under the name identity cri-
terion, the effect of contrast was 72, 40, and 49 milliseconds for phys-
ical match, name match, and different trials, respectively. The results
of this study are thus more equivocal than might be desired.
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Miller (1979) conducted a number of experiments in an attempt to
describe the underlying mechanisms of the probability effect at the
encoding stage of processing. He used additive factors logic and man-
ipulated stimulus quality, pairing two stimuli of different probabili-
ties with one response, and two equiprobable stimuli (each visually
similar to one member of the first pair) with another. An RT difference
between two stimuli of the first type is referred to as a direct proba-
bility effect, and a difference between stimuli of the second type is an
indirect probability effect. An example will explain the reasoning
behind the use of these terms.
In one experiment, Miller used the letter pairs I-K and T-R
. No-
tice that a member of each pair has a good deal of featural overlap with
a member of the other pair. The assignment of stimuli was counterbal-
anced, but for some subjects I and K were assigned to one response and
appeared with probabilities of .46 and
.04, respectively. T and R were
assigned to the other response and appeared with probability of .25.
Each response was thus equally likely. II probability was to have the
effect of sensitizing specific feature detectors such that more probable
features are more readily identified, one might expect a direct proba-
bility effect when comparing RTs to I and K, and an indirect effect when
comparing RTs to T and R. If such effects are present, then they should
be affected by contrast, assuming feature detection takes place during
encoding. Miller I ound a direct probability eflecl wli i < li was greatei
at a lower I eve I of contrast, but failed to observe an indirect proba-
bility effect. He interpreted these results as evidence that probabil-
ity does not a fleet featural processing, and hypothesized that proba-
13
bility either affects a detector which is sensitive to the entire visnal
form of the stimulus or the nam i„g process (cf. Miller and Parhelia,
1976; Pachella and Miller, 1976).
In order to distinguish between these two alternatives, Miller ran
an experiment using the same task, but with different stimuli. The
stimulus set consisted of two versions of each of the uppercase letters
A and Y. One version of each letter was paired with a single response,
and the rest of the procedure was identical to the previous experiment.
If probability affects sensitivity to the entire physical form, then one
should observe a direct probability effect which interacts with contrast,
and no indirect probability effect. Since it is not possible to perform
this task solely on the basis of the name of the stimulus (since each
name is associated with both responses), the stimulus identification
(or naming) explanation predicts that there should be no contrast by
probability interaction in the direct condition.
Miller observed a direct probability effect, but there was no con-
trast by probability interaction in the direct condition. He did not
find an indirect probability effect. These results favor the stimulus
identification explanation. Although it was logically possible for
subjects to make their responses on the basis of the stimulus name cou-
pled with some sort of physical information, it appears that subjects
did not do this. In fact, Miller reported that there was a reverse
probability effect for the error rates in the indirect condition, sug-
gesting that the overlearned stimulus name became available in spite of
subjects' strategies and actually served to interfere in the task. That
is, the name of the more probable stimulus in the direct condition
became associated with that response, so that when the other stimulus of
the same name was presented, subjects had to combat a tendency to res-
pond incorrectly
.
Miller was also interested in whether it is necessarily the activa-
tion of a name code per se that is affected by probability when the con-
trast by probability interaction is observed, or if some more general
abstract code might also be affected. A description of the stimuli
that he used to address this question should clarify the notion of an
abstract code. Miller used a set of four stimuli that may be thought
of as consisting of the orthogonal combination of binary values on two
dimensions. Each stimulus was comprised of a shape (an X or a diamond)
and a bar position (a horizontal bar which was either above or below
the shape). The task and the assignment of stimuli to responses were
the same as in the other experiments. To give an example, the X-with-
underbar and diamond-with-overbar might be paired with one response and
be the direct probability stimuli, while the X-with-overbar and the
diamond-with-underbar would be paired with the other response.
As in the previous experiment, subjects cannot respond solely on
the basis of the shape name, since it is paired with both responses; nor
does it seem likely that subjects would invent their own names for each
stimulus, since this did not occur in other experiments using nonsense
stimuli (Miller and Pachella, 1976), or in Miller's Experiment 3.
Miller argued that in contrast to those experiments, however, the stim-
uli may easily be uniquely identified on the basis of their values on
two salient dimensions, corresponding to the notion of an abstract code.
Miller (Experiment 4) observed both direct and indirect probability
15
effects with these stimuli, but only the former was sensitive to con-
trast. This result is consistent with the possibility that subjects
utilized abstract codes in encoding the stimuli, and that the activation
of these codes was affected by probability. As Miller pointed out, the
finding that indirect probability did not interact with contrast sug-
gests a different mechanism may be involved than the one underlying the
direct probability effect.
To further test the notion that probability has an effect on the
activation of an abstract code, Miller (Experiment 6) asked his subjects
to perform a task that was identical to that of Experiment 4, but in
which the stimuli could not be identified on the basis of their dimen-
sional values. Although Miller referred to the stimuli of Experiment 4
as consisting of two binary features, it may be less ambiguous to adopt
some working definitions that have been proposed by Garner (1978). He
suggested that an attribute is any variable property of a set of stim-
uli, a feature is an attribute of a stimulus that either does not exist
or exists at only a single level within a stimulus set, and a dimension
is an attribute that exists at some positive level within each member of
a stimulus set. Thus, the stimulus set of Experiment 4 possessed the
dimensions of shape and bar position. In contrast, the four stimuli
used in Experiment 6 were comprised of a shape dimension (an X or a box)
and one of four features (under- or overbar for the X, vertical or hori-
zontal bar inside the box) . The S-R mapping was such that a response
could not be made solely on the basis of the stimulus shape. Since
dimensional values presumably were represented as abstract codes in
Experiment 4, and since this representation was not possible for the
combination of task and stimuli in Experiment 6, Miller predicted that
probability would not have an effect on encoding in the latter experi-
ment. The results indicated a direct probability effect, no indirect
effect, and no interaction with contrast, thus upholding Miller's pre-
diction. He interpreted these results to mean that stimulus probability
may affect not only the activation of a name code, but also any
abstract, meaningful code. The implication is that somehow dimensions
are meaningful or abstract, and features are not.
Logogen model
.
Miller (1979) explained his results using a version
of Morton's (1969) logogen model. According to this conception, the
encoding of the visual features of the stimulus activates a particular
logogen that may correspond to either a name code or an abstract code,
in the sense described earlier. The effect of probability at the
encoding level is to adjust the threshold at which a logogen is acti-
vated. Specifically, logogens corresponding to highly probable stimuli
are assumed to have lower thresholds than those corresponding to less
probable stimuli. Thus, the amount of evidence necessary to activate
logogens of more probable stimili is less, meaning that those logogens
may be activated faster. If one makes the additional assumption that
the effect of contrast is on the rate of accumulation of visual fea-
tures (cf. Pachella and Fisher, 1969), this leads to the interaction
between the effects of probability and contrast at the encoding level.
The understanding of this mechanism is relatively straightforward
for logogens corresponding to the name of a stimulus, but is less so for
logogens corresponding to abstract codes, as would be the case in
Miller's Experiment 4. In clarifying the process under these circum-
stances, Miller claimed that there need not be a one-to-one correspon-
dence between stimuli and logogens. In his Experiment 4, for example,
a logogen would exist for each value on the two dimensions. A given
stimulus would activate two logogens in this case, and a response would
be made on the basis of the particular combination of activated logo-
gens. The direct probability by contrast interaction is thus in accor-
dance with the model. What does not seem to be in accordance, however,
is the additivity of contrast and probability in the indirect condition
As Miller pointed out, each stimulus in the indirect condition had a
more probable and a less probable dimensional value, so it might be ex-
pected that the facilitating effects would cancel. This did not happen
however, and Miller proposed that the indirect effect was due to the
greater salience of the shape dimension over the bar position dimension
Since the same mechanism is responsible for the indirect probability
effect under this interpretation, one would expect to observe an inter-
action of the effect with contrast, as in the direct probability condi-
tion. The failure to observe such an interaction is problematic for
this interpretation.
Finally, Miller suggested that in situations in which the proba-
bility effect is unaffected by the level of contrast, the subject does
not (or perhaps cannot) utilize abstract codes. One possible reason
for this is that abstract codes are useful only when a memorized res-
ponse rule is necessary in order to perform the task. When this is not
the case, subjects may in effect bypass the stimulus identification
stage by setting up direct visual-to-motor linkages, according to
Miller. It may also be the case that subjects are unable to use an
18
abstract code because one simply does not exist, as in some tasks using
nonsense stimuli (e.g., Miller, 1979, Experiments 3 and 6; Miller and
Pachella, 1976). Although it was possible to construct arbitrary stimu-
lus names for these stimuli, it may have been that the association
between stimulus and name was too weak to allow this to be a viable
strategy in those tasks.
If the effect of probability at encoding is to lower the activat-
ing threshold of a logogen corresponding to a name or abstract code,
it follows that the effect should transfer from a direct probability
condition using uppercase letters (for example) to an indirect condi-
tion using lowercase letters with the same names. Also, the indirect
probability effect should interact with contrast. Miller and Hardzinski
(1981) tested these predictions, and found no evidence of transfer
across case. They also replicated Miller's (1979) finding of no trans-
fer to visually similar letters, providing further evidence against
the sensitizing of feature detectors as a mechanism for the probability
effect. They concluded that probability affects the rate of transmis-
sion of evidence about specific features to a specific logogen, label-
ling this phenomenon "route-specific activation." Miller and Hardzinski
mention case-specific sublogogens for a given letter as possible sites
for probability-induced activation. These sublogogens would then trans-
mit evidence to letter-name logogens. However, it is not clear how
this explanation would account for effects with non-alphanumeric stimuli
(cf. Miller, 1979, Experiment 4).
Verification model . An alternative mechanism of the probability
effect is provided by the verification model proposed by Becker (1976,
1980; Becker and Killion, 1977). Although this model was originally
intended as an account of word recognition, Becker has suggested that it
may be broadened to include general expectancy effects. According to
the model, stimulus information is first stored in sensory memory, from
which sensory features are extracted via feature analysis. These sen-
sory features serve to activate what I will call stimulus detectors
(corresponding to Becker's word detectors) by accumulating in a manner
similar to that in the logogen model. Up to this point, there is essen-
tially no difference between the verification model and the logogen
model. The first difference between the two lies in the significance of
an activated stimulus detector; namely, the activation of a stimulus
detector does not correspond to stimulus recognition. This is because
it is assumed that the output of feature analysis is limited to the
identification of primitive featural components such as arcs and line
segments. The output lacks information concerning the relations between
these primitive components. The purpose of feature analysis, then, is
to specify a set of stimulus detectors (hereafter referred to as the
sensory feature-defined set) that are consistent with the primitive
featural characteristics of the stimulus.
Once this set has been identified, a process known as verification
commences, and it is through this process that the stimulus is actually
identified. The "stimuli" corresponding to the stimulus detectors are
serially selected, and are used together with additional information
stored with the stimulus detector to construct a representation of the
stimulus. The additional information concerns the relationships among
the primitive features that have been identified. This information is
presumably abstracted from previous experxence. The constructed repre-
sentation is compared with the information in sensory memory, and if a
good match is obtained, the stimulus is identified. If a match is not
obtained, another "stimulus" is selected and a representation is con-
structed and compared with the sensory information, the process con-
tinuing in this manner until the stimulus is identified. Becker has
suggested that the order in which "words" are selected from the sensory
feature-defined set in a word recognition task is determined by word
frequency. A generalization of this view would be that the order of
"stimulus" selection is determined by relative frequency, or prob-
ability.
This is only one way that probability may have an effect according
to the verification model. A second possibility arises via the factor
of expectancy. In this case, an expectation of a particular stimulus
by the subject is enough to activate one or more stimulus detectors.
The verification process can thus begin without waiting for feature
analysis to take place. If it is assumed that more probable stimuli
are correctly expected more often than less probable stimuli, this
mechanism can produce a probability effect.
The mechanism responsible for the probability by contrast inter-
action in the verification model is quite different from that in the
logogen model. It is assumed that contrast has its effect on the fea-
ture analysis process and also on the rate at which information is
stored in sensory memory. The verification process is assumed to be
unaffected by contrast manipulation. A highly probable stimulus would
tend to be correctly expected more often and feature analysis thus by-
passed, while processing of less probable stimuli would more often than
not include feature analysis. This is because an incorrect expectation
would necessitate the selection of further "stimuli" from the sensory
feature-defined set. The effect of contrast will thus tend to have two
loci (sensory memory and feature analysis) for less probable stimuli,
and only one (sensory memory) for highly probable stimuli. The verifi-
cation model is therefore able to account for probability and contrast
main effects, and the probability by contrast interaction. Furthermore,
this account differs from that of the logogen model, which uses a com-
bination of varied logogen thresholds and varied rates of accumulation
of evidence to explain these effects. While neither model is satisfac-
tory in its ability to predict the presence or absence of a probability
by contrast interaction, the verification model perhaps is less so.
Whereas the logogen models assumes that a logogen does not exist for
stimuli which are not characterized by abstract codes, the verification
model lacks a specific construct such as a logogen, assuming that expec-
tancies are not or cannot be generated at a perceptual level when stim-
uli are not identified on the basis of abstract codes. The importance
of the abstract code as a mediator of the probability effect on encoding
is the focus of Experiment 1 of the present student.
Causes of the probability effect . It is possible to conceive of the
probability effect as an indirect result of one or several (more) basic
factors (e.g., Keele, 1973; Posner, 1978). One candidate for such a
factor is expectancy, the conscious anticipation of a particular stimu-
lus. RTs to predicted (expected) events are less than to nonpredicted
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events (e.g., Bernstein and Reese, 1967), and subjects tend to correctly
expect frequent events more than infrequent events (e.g., Myers, 1976).
Thus, the probability effect may be a result of the fact that the prob-
ability of a correct expectation given a more probable stimulus will be
greater than the probability of a correct expectation given a less
probable stimulus. A second factor that may underlie the probability
effect is stimulus repetition. Responses to repeated stimuli tend to be
faster than to nonrepeated stimuli (e.g., Bertelson, 1963). The proba-
bility effect may merely be a reflection of the fact that stimuli are
repeated more often than infrequent stimuli.
A number of investigators have examined the extent to which expec-
tancy, repetition, and probability effects may be identified with one
another. The procedure in these studies has been to look for the pre-
sence of one effect with the other factor(s) held constant. If the
effect is detected, it may be concluded that the factors ought not to be
identified with one another. Keele (1969) failed to observe a repeti-
tion effect for trials preceded by an incorrect prediction. Geller and
Pitz (1970) obtained a similar result, but observed a residual repeti-
tion effect when two or more successive repetitions occurred. Bernstein
and Reese (1965) manipulated probability via the number of alternative
stimuli presented and observed a probability effect for incorrectly pre-
dicted stimuli. Similarly, Hinrichs and Crafts (1971) obtained a prob-
ability effect for incorrectly guessed stimuli by directly manipulating
stimulus presentation probability.
On the basis of these results, it may be concluded that the proba-
bility effect does not result solely from expectancy. In addition,
expectancy might underlie the repetition P ffPrt i -ettec , implying that probabil-
ity is also distinct from repetition. The discrepancy between Keele's
results and those of Geller and Pitz weakens the latter conclusion,
though, and suggests that more than the immediately preceding stimulus
should be considered when examining sequential effects.
A number of studies have examined the nature of higher order
sequential effects. Remington (1969) manipulated probability and
observed a probability effect with sequence held constant. He also
noted significant fifth-order sequential effects. (The preceding n-1
stimuli are taken into account in an nth-order analysis.) Using the
waveform of the cortical event-related potential as the dependent mea-
sure, Squires, Wickens, Squires, and Donchin (1976) reported similar
results. Schvaneveldt and Chase (1969) examined fourth-order sequential
effects and found that subjects' expectancies obtained via verbal pre-
dictions did not correspond well with sequential effects on reaction
time, a result consistent with that of Geller and Pitz (1970). This
suggests that expectancy might be characterized using two components;
one would involve the subject's conscious expectancy (or prediction)
made on the basis of hypotheses conforming to probabilistic intuitions,
and the other could be a lower level, perhaps unconscious, expectancy
produced by the preceding stimulus sequence. Together with the findings
regarding probability, the results of the above studies suggest that
there are at least three distinct factors operating in choice reaction
time tasks: conscious expectancy, sequential expectancy, and stimulus
probability
.
The previous conclusion follows only if the assumption is made
that a subject is in either state E. or E. (expects or does not) with
respect to a particular stimulus. This assumption is not necessarily
valid. For example, a model that assumes a subject to be somewhere on
an expectancy continuum seems equally plausible. Thus, the finding of
a probability effect for unpredicted stimuli (for example) does not
necessarily imply that probability is unexplainable in terms of expec-
tancy. The predicted stimulus may merely have been the most expected
out of some set of expected stimuli. More probable stimuli could tend
to fall higher on the expectancy continuum than less probable ones, so
expectancy would then be able to account for the probability effect.
Furthermore, all of the studies previously mentioned in this sec-
tion have a serious shortcoming in light of the present discussion.
None has shown that a unique probability mechanism must exist at an
encoding level. It is possible that the factors are independent at a
response level of processing, but conscious expectancy (for example)
underlies the probability effect at the perceptual level. Such a state
of affairs would implicate a dynamic (rather than static) mechanism as
responsible for the probability effect at a perceptual level. This
possibility was tested by Miller and Anbar (1981). They attempted to
separate the effects of probability and conscious expectancy, but unlike
previous investigators, they also manipulated contrast, permitting con-
clusions regarding perceptual encoding. Expectancies were induced by
providing subjects with a pretrial cue. Miller and Anbar observed the
usual interaction of probability with contrast, but noted no tendency
for expectancy to interact with contrast. This null result occurred in
one experiment in which probability was also manipulated, and in a
second which varied only expectancy and contrast. This suggests that
probability is a factor distinct from conscious expectancy at the
encoding level, since probability is known to affect encoding, but con
scious expectancy did not do so. The conclusion is thus that a rela-
tively static probability mechanism influences encoding. However, con
scious expectancy is not the only factor that might underlie a dynamic
mechanism. It is also possible that the factor of sequential expec-
tancy, mentioned earlier, could function according to such a mechan-
ism; expectancies would arise on the basis of the preceding stimulus
sequence. Experiments 2 and 3 examine the extent to which the effect
of probability at encoding may be explained by sequential expectancy.
CHAPTER II
EXPERIMENTS
Experiment 1
Miller (1979) concluded that stimulus probability influences
encoding only when the stimuli can be characterized by abstract codes
such as a name or dimensional value. Although this conclusion is con-
sistent with results of previous experiments, the evidence is not con-
clusive, since stimuli in these experiments differed in ways other than
the degree to which they could be characterized by abstract codes. The
purpose of Experiment 1 was to provide a strong test of the role of the
abstract code as a mediator of the probability effect at encoding by
presenting the same stimuli in conditions which either encouraged or
discouraged the use of abstract codes.
In his third experiment, Miller (1979) used letter stimuli and
found that the effects of contrast and probability were additive.
Usually, the use of alphanumeric stimuli has yielded a probability by
contrast interaction. However, in this experiment, two versions of the
same uppercase letter were assigned to different responses so that the
stimulus names could not easily be used in making responses and were in
fact likely to interfere if they were used. In the studies in which the
contrast by probability interaction has been observed (e.g., Miller,
1979, Experiment 1; Miller and Pachella, 1973, 1976; Stanovich and
Pachella, 1977), it was possible, and in fact a good strategy, to uti-
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lize the stimulus name in performing the task. On the basxs of this
difference, Miller implicated the name code (and ultimately the abstract
code) as a key factor in the mechanism responsible for the probability
effect at encoding.
It may be argued, however, that some more subtle difference in the
stimuli, and not the availability of an abstract code, was actually res-
ponsible for the disparate results. The present experiment was an
attempt to rule out this possibility. The same four stimuli were pre-
sented in two conditions. One condition was designed to encourage the
use of abstract codes, while the other was designed to discourage their
use. According to the abstract code explanation, the probability by
contrast interaction should be observed in the former condition, and
be absent in the latter.
Method .
Subjects
.
Forty-nine students at the University of Massachusetts
received course credit for their participation in an experimental ses-
sion lasting about 40 minutes. No subject exceeded a pre-experimental
criterion of 8% errors at either level of contrast. The data of one
subject were replaced because she lost a contact lens during the experi-
ment .
Apparatus and stimuli . A Hewlett-Packard 2114B computer controlled
the presentation of stimuli and recorded responses and response laten-
cies. Stimuli were presented on an HP1300A X-Y display oscilloscope in
a dimly lit room. Responses were made by pressing one of two keys
located on a response panel in front of the subj ect . Subj ects viewed
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the stimuli from a distance of about 100 on. Stimuli were approximately
1 cm wide and 1.2 an high. Contrast between a stimulus and its back-
ground was reduced by placing a 1.5 log unit neutral densxty filter in
front of the oscilloscope.
The stimulus set consisted of four figures, each constructed so
as to be identifiable by two names. In the letter condition, subjects
were told that the stimuli were two uppercase versions of the letters
A and 0. In the object condition, stimuli were labelled as a table and
a tepee (corresponding to the As), and a circle and a square (corres-
ponding to the 0s). In the letter condition, two stimuli were associ-
ated with each name, while in the object condition, there was only one
stimulus per name. The use of a simple name code was thus discouraged
in the letter condition, and encouraged in the object condition. Sub-
jects in the latter condition were told that the experiment was con-
cerned with how people identify letters written in different styles of
type. Subjects in the object condition were told that the concern was
with how people identify simple drawings of objects. When questioned
after the experiment, eight subjects in the letter condition reported
that they treated the stimuli as something other than letters. All
others reported treating the stimuli as instructed. Using the letter
names for reference, one letter from each pair was associated with a
single response. The pairing was the same for all subjects. One pair
comprised the direct probability condition, the other pair, the indirect
probability condition . Direct probability stimuli appeared 40 or 10
times in a block of 100 trials, while each indirect probability stimulus
appeared 25 times. Subjects were told that the stimuli would not neces-
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sarily appear an equal number of times. The assignment of stimulus
pairs to direct and indirect conditions was counterbalanced across sub-
jects, as was the assignment of stimuli to presentation probabilities
within the direct probability condition.
Pr° CedUr
--
An exP e rimental session consisted of six blocks of 100
trials each. The first two blocks were considered practice, and the
level of stimulus contrast alternated from block to block. Stimuli were
presented in random fashion by the computer, subject to the constraint
that each stimulus appeared with the appropriate frequency during a trial
block. One half of the subjects were assigned to the letter condition,
and the remaining subjects were assigned to the object condition. The
order of contrast level and type assignment of preferred hand to proba-
bility condition (direct versus indirect) were counterbalanced across
subj ects
.
Subjects were allowed approximately five minutes to dark adapt
before the first practice block. There was a one to two minute rest
period between blocks. A trial consisted of the presentation of a warn-
ing signal (two crosses above and below the location of the ensuing
stimulus) for 250 msec, with the stimulus appearing 250 msec after its
offset. The stimulus remained on the screen until a response was made.
One second elapsed before the next warning signal, during which time
the screen remained blank or the word "error" was presented, depending
on the response. Subjects were instructed to respond as quickly and
accurately as possible. RTs to error trials were recorded but not
analyzed, nor were RTs of two seconds or longer.
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^
sets of mean RTs and proportion of correct responses (PC) were confuted;
one set for the direct probability condition, and one for the indirect
condition. Analyses of variance were performed on the RTs and PC of
each set. The analyses involved three within-subject variables (two
levels each of probability, contrast, and practice), and four between-
subject variables. The latter consisted of label condition (letter
versus object), order of contrast alternation (beginning with high
versus low), mapping condition (which of the two pairs of stimuli were
presented in the probability condition of interest), and hand used to
respond (preferred or not). The practice variable was constructed by
assigning Blocks 3 and 4 to one level, and 5 and 6 to the other.
Direct probability condition
. Results of the direct probability
condition are summarized in Table 1. RTs were shorter for more probable
stimuli (F(l,32) = 98.72, p < .001, MS_
e
= 5,507), and for stimuli at the
high level of contrast (F(l,32) = 204.22, p < .001, MS
£
= 7,964). Sub-
jects responded about 25 msec faster in Blocks 5 and 6 than in 3 and 4
(F(l,32) = 25.38, p < .001, MS
g
= 2,350). The predicted label condition
by contrast by probability interaction did not approach significance
(p > .10), and the trend in the data was in fact opposite to that antici
pated. The probability effect was 16 msec greater at low contrast than
at high contrast in the letter condition (F(l,l6) = 3.32, . 05 < p_ < .10,
MS
^
= 960), and virtually the same at both contrast levels in the object
condition (F < 1). There was no suggestion that any of these effects
was due to a speed-accuracy trade-off. More probable stimuli were
responded to more accurately (F(l,32) = 25.81, p < .001, MS_
e
= .004),
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and this effect was unchanged by lahel condition (F < 1 ) . There was
no effect of contrast, nor evidence of a probability by contrast inter-
action, in the overall analysis or in separate analyses performed on
the PC data of each label condition (F < 1 in all instances).
These results are inconclusive with respect to the role of
abstract code as a mediator of the probability effect at encoding,
the basis of Miller's (1979) observation of an additive relationship
between contrast and probability when more than one stimulus was
assigned to a name, a similar relationship between the two factors was
predicted in the letter condition of the present experiment. If an
abstract code is important, then a probability by contrast interaction
should have been observed in the object condition. The finding of a
marginal interaction in the letter condition suggests that subjects in
this condition may have invented their own names for some of the stim-
uli, a strategy to which some subjects admitted. However, the absence
of the interaction in the object condition is problematic for this
interpretation. Perhaps it is critical to the abstract code explanation
that these codes be extremely well learned. This would be the case for
alphanumeric stimuli, as in the letter condition, but possibly not for
names of the object stimuli. Subjects in the letter condition might
have used the letter names for stimuli in the direct probability condi-
tion, and used invented names for indirect probability stimuli. Since
only some portion of the subjects should have retained the letter names
for the direct probability stimuli, the finding of a relatively small,
marginally significant interaction is thus in keeping with this view.
This interpretation is obviously speculative, and is offered merely as
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some attempt to account for the present results.
The RT analysis also revealed a number of theoretically uninterest-
ing interactions, which will be reported with no interpretation. The
effect of probability was greater when subjects responded with their
preferred hand (F(l,32) = 5.15, p < .05, MS
g
= 5,507). The probability
effect was relatively larger in opposing mapping conditions across
label conditions (F(l,32) = 7.13, p < .05, MS_
e
= 5,507). Similarly,
the practice effect was differentially affected by the order of contrast
alternation across mapping conditions (F(l,32) = 7,65, p < .01, MS =
2,350). Finally, the contrast by probability interaction was observed
primarily in Blocks 3 and 4 when the high contrast condition was pre-
sented first, but not in Blocks 5 and 6 when low contrast came first
(F(l,32) = 5.45, p < .05, MS_
e
= 2,511).
Indirect probability condition
. Miller (1979) observed what he
termed a reverse error rate effect for indirect stimuli in an experiment
much like the present letter condition. He suggested that the name of
the most probable (.40) stimulus became associated more strongly with
the response to direct probability stimuli, while the name of the least
probable (.10) stimulus was associated with the hand used in the in-
direct probability condition. The more probable name would then inter-
fere with the execution of a correct response in the indirect condition,
whereas the less probable name would tend to activate a correct response
in this condition. This should only happen when the same name is used
to respond to stimuli requiring different responses. On the basis of
Miller's finding, a reverse probability effect was expected in the PC
data, RT data, or both, but only in the letter condition.
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Analyses of the RT data for each label condition revealed virtually
no effect in the object condition, and a slight trend in the direction
opposite to that expected xn the letter condition (F < 1 in both cases).
Results from the PC data were parallel, the effect failing to approach
significance in either label condition (both ps > .25). These results
are consistent with the interpretation given for the observation of
the probability by contrast interaction for letter stimuli in the direct
probability condition. The failure to observe even a trend toward a
reverse probability effect for letters in the indirect condition sug-
gests that subjects might have used more names than those provided to
perform the task.
Experiment 2
Miller and Anbar (1981) demonstrated that expectancy as generated
by a pretrial cue did not interact with contrast. Since the probability
by contrast interaction has been observed in a number of studies, they
reasoned that the effect of probability at encoding is not explainable
in terms of expectancy. However, this conclusion may not generalize to
expectancies induced in other ways. One alternative cause of expectan-
cies is the stimulus sequence leading up to a particular trial . As pre-
viously discussed, sequential expectancy might underlie the probability
effect at encoding because more probable stimuli tend to be repeated
more often. If so, it should be possible to show that the magnitude of
sequential effects increases as contrast decreases . By reasoning simi-
lar to that of Miller and Anbar, if sequential effects are not influ-
enced by contrast, it may be concluded that sequential effects do not
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underlie the probability effect at encoding. This conclusion would be
warranted more strongly if an additive relationship between sequence and
contrast was demonstrated concurrently with a probability by contrast
interaction. Without a concurrent demonstration of effects, the logic
of the experiment may require sequential expectancy to account for a
nonexistent effect of probability at encoding. Consequently, probabil-
ity was manipulated along with contrast in the present experiment, and
sequential effects were examined.
Method
.
Subjects. Twenty-six students at the University of Massachusetts
received course credit for their participation in an experimental ses-
sion lasting about 40 minutes. The data of two subjects were replaced
because they exceeded the 8% error criterion at a single level of con-
trast.
Procedure
.
The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 1,
with several exceptions. The stimuli were the uppercase letters G, N,
S, and K. They were about .7 cm wide and 1.2 cm high. One pair of
stimuli was assigned to each response, and the pairs were always G-N and
S-K. The pairs were constructed such that one globally curved and one
globally angular letter were members of each pair. The stimuli were
described to subjects as four letters.
Probability was manipulated over a range of values to examine the
continuous nature of the effect. The members of one pair appeared with
frequencies of 10 or 40 in a block of 100 trials, and members of the
other pair appeared 20 or 30 times. The eight possible assignments of
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stimuli to probabilities are shown in Table 2. Finally, the absolute
level of stimulus contrast was decreased in order to increase the size
of the contrast effect.
Resu lts and discussion. Analyses related to the probability effect will
be considered first, followed by analyses of sequential effects. Only
data from the last four trial blocks were analyzed.
Probability analyses
. An analysis of variance was performed on the
mean RTs. The analysis involved one between-subj ects variable, the
order of contrast alternation (two levels), and three within-subj ects
variables. The latter consisted of contrast and practice (each two
levels), and probability (four levels). Results are summarized in
Table 3. RTs increased with decreasing probability (F(3,66) = 22.25,
p < .001, MS
e
= 4,695). The effect of contrast was larger than in
Experiment 1 (236 versus 120 msec), and highly significant (F(l,22) =
139.25, p_ < .001, MS
e
= 38,515). Subjects responded about 26 msec
faster in Blocks 5 and 6 than in 3 and 4 (F(l,22) = 7.15, p < .05,
—e
= 8,890). As expected, the magnitude of the probability effect
tended to be greater at low contrast (F(3,66) = 4.66, p < .01,
MS_
e
= 2,731). No other effects approached significance. There was no
suggestion that any of the above effects was due to a speed-accuracy
trade-off. More probable stimuli were responded to more accurately
(F(3,66) = 24.07, p < .001, MS_
e
= .0014), and the contrast effect
approached significance (F(l,22) = 3.81, . 05 < p < .10, MS_
e
= .0020).
The contrast by probability interaction did not approach significance
(p > .10).
TABLE 2
Assignments of stimuli to probability for Experiment(response pairs were always G-N and S-K)
.
Condition
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Probability
^1 ^2 . 3
N K S
G K S
N S K
G s K
K N G
S N G
K G N
S G N
TABLE 3
Mean reaction times (in msec) and proportion of correct responsesCm parentheses) for Experiment 2.
Low contrast
. 10
801 (.902)
llifth contrast 538 (.935)
Probability
•20
.30
760 (.960) 716 (.969)
516 (.968) 506 (.972)
.40
708 (.972)
480 (.980)
Both the logogen and the verification models predict that the
effect of probability on reaction time should be greater at low con-
trast. Although there was a significant interaction between probability
and contrast level which reflected a general tendency for contrast
effects to be larger for lower levels of probability, there was a rever-
sal between probability levels .4 and .3 (see Table 3). The results of
a trend analysis, however, indicated that only the linear components of
the probability effect differed significantly at the two levels of con-
trast (F(l,22) = 10.38, p < .01, MS
e
= 2,299). Furthermore, analyses of
the data at each contrast level indicated that for both levels, only
the linear component of the probability effect was significant (at low
contrast, F(l,22) = 55.62, £ < .001, MS^ = 4,528; at high contrast,
£(1,22) = 36.19, £ < .001, MS^ = 2,220). It may therefore be concluded
that probability had its predicted effect at encoding.
Sequential analyses
. In the previous section, it was established
that probability affected encoding in the present experiment. Given
the presence of this effect, it is reasonable to ask if sequential
expectancy is the underlying mechanism for it. If so, then a sequence
by contrast interaction should be present in the data. By examining
sequential effects at a constant probability level, the effect of prob-
ability may be prevented from contributing to a potential sequence by
contrast interaction . Accordingly, sequential effects were examined
only for trials in the .4 probability condition. Several investigators
(e.g., Remington, 1969; Schvaneveldt and Chase, 1969) have observed
significant fourth-order sequential effects. The preceding three
stimuli were therefore taken into account in the present analyses.
There were not enough observations at each sequence level to permit
analyses at probability levels of £ < .4.
A two (order of contrast alternation) by two (contrast level) by
eight (sequence) analysis of variance was performed on the RT data. The
results are summarized in Table 4. The 228 msec effect of contrast was
significant (F(l,22) = 108.37, E < .001, MS
e
= 46,184), as was the
effect of preceding sequence (F(7,154) = 21.35, g < .001, MS
e
= 4,055).
Consistent with past observations of sequential effects (e.g.,
Schvaneveldt and Chase, 1969), it is apparent in Table 4 that RT
decreases with increasing run length, and tends to increase with lag
(the number of intervening trials between stimulus presentations). The
sequence by contrast interaction was not significant (F(7,154) = 1.65,
£ > .10, MS ^ = 2,872). The failure to observe this interaction pro-
vides no evidence suggesting that the probability effect at encoding is
explainable in terms of sequential expectancy, since probability inter-
acted with contrast in the same experiment, thereby demonstrating a
probability effect at encoding in the absence of sequential effects
there. However, this conclusion should be accepted with caution.
Ninety-five percent confidence intervals were obtained for the contrast
effect for each sequence . They revealed that differences of 20 to 40
msec in the size of the effect across sequences (the magnitude typically
observed in probability by contrast interactions) could have gone unde-
tected. For example, the 95% confidence interval for the contrast
effect in the BBB condition extended from 271 to 173 msec. In the AAA
condition, the interval extended from 255 to 141 msec. Stimuli in the
latter condition should be expected more strongly, so it is possible
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that the effect of contrast may have been greater for unexpected stim-
uli. Furthermore, there appears to be a slight tendency for the con-
trast effect to be greater for sequences that would produce incorrect
expectancies. While sequential expectancy does not appear to be a
likely candidate for the mechanxsm underlying the effect of probability
at encoding, this possibility cannot be completely ruled out due to the
ambiguity of the observed null result.
Experiment 3
In order to achieve a more conclusive result regarding the rela-
tionship of sequential expectancy and probability at encoding, Experi-
ment 2 was replicated, with several minor changes. The most significant
of these was that only two levels of probability were used (.05 and
.45), to allow a greater number of observations to be made for the
sequential analysis. The rationale and predictions were identical to
those of Experiment 2. In addition, the repeated finding of additivity
between the effects of sequence and contrast would strengthen the con-
clusion that sequential expectancies are not responsible for the prob-
ability effect at encoding.
Method .
Subj ects . Thirty-three students at the University of Massachusetts
received course credit for their participation in an experimental ses-
sion lasting about 40 minutes. The data of one subject were replaced
because the 8% criterion at a single level of contrast was exceeded.
Procedure. The procedure was the same as that of Experiment 2,
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with several exceptions. There were two levels of stimulus probability,
•05 and
.45. One member of each letter pair (G-N and S-K) was assigned
to each level. This provided 180 observations per subject in the
sequential analysis, as opposed to 80 in Experiment 2. The assignments
of stimuli to probabilities are shown in Table 5. An initial practice
block was added; subjects always viewed stimuli in this block at the
high contrast level so that they would be familiar with them when seen
for the first time at low contrast. Lastly, the absolute level of
contrast was raised a small amount relative to Experiment 2 in order to
make stimuli in the dim condition slightly easier to see.
Results a nd discussion
. Analyses related to the probability effect will
be considered first, followed by analyses of sequential effects. Only
data from the last four trial blocks were analyzed.
Probability analyses
. An analysis of variance was performed on the
mean RTs
.
The analysis involved two between-subj ects variables, the
order of contrast alternation (two levels), and stimulus-to-probability
mapping condition (four levels). The four within-subj ects variables
(each two levels) were: hand used to respond, practice, contrast, and
probability. Results are summarized in Table 6. Subjects responded
about 19 msec faster with their preferred hands (F(l,24) = 8.91,
£ < .01, MS ^ = 5,089), and were about 21 msec faster in Blocks 6 and 7
than in 4 and 5 (F(l,24) = 10.48, p < .01, MS
e
= 5,502). The contrast
effect was about 156 msec (F(l,24) = 82.56, p_ < .001, hS^ = 37,636), and
more probable stimuli were responded to faster than less probable stim-
uli (F(l,24) = 126.51, p < .001, MS_
e
= 29,808). The probability effect
TABLE 5
Assignments of stimuli to probabilities for Experiment 3(.response pairs were always G-N and S-K)
.
Condition
1 2 3
High probability (.45) G,S G,K N,S
Low probability (.05) N,K N,S G,K
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TABLE 6
Mean RTs (in msec) and proportion of correct responses(m parentheses) for Experiment 3.
Probability
05
.45
Low contrast 781 (.927) 598 (.981)
High contrast 614 (.433) 453 (.983)
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(172 msec) was considerably larger than in Experiments 1 and 2 (in which
it was about 75 msec), reflecting the more extreme probability values
used in the present experiment. The probability effect was 22 msec
greater at low contrast than at high contrast and this interaction
approached significance (1(1,24) = 3.80, . 05 < p < .10, MS = 4 169)
—
e
> J '
An analysxs of the PC data collapsing over practice revealed that prob-
ability was the only variable to have an effect (F(l,24) = 27.24,
p_ < .001, MS
e
= .0065). Thus, none of the RT effects were due to a
speed-accuracy trade-off. The finding that the probability by contrast
interaction was only marginally significant was interpreted as most
likely being an instance of Type II error. The interaction has been
observed numerous times in experiments using alphanumeric stimuli (as
cited in the introduction), was observed in Experiment 2, and was very
close to significance in the present experiment (p = .06). It therefore
seems safe to conclude that the difference in magnitude of the prob-
ability effect across contrast conditions is real.
Two unpredicted interactions were present in the RT analysis which
could not be interpreted or meaningfully described in a concise manner.
One was the mapping condition by order of contrast alternation by prac-
tice by contrast interaction (F(3,24) = 3.35, p < .05, MS_
e
= 3,226), and
the other was the mapping by order by contrast by probability interac-
tion (F(3,24) = 3.08, p < .05, MS = 4,169). Since each cell of these
— —
—
e
interactions contained data from only four subjects, these effects may
have been produced by a few atypical subjects whose impact on the cell
means could have been fairly substantial.
Sequential analyses . The data of eight subjects were not available
for the sequential analysis due to experimenter error. Consequently,
the RT data of the 24 remaining subjects were analyzed with regard to
probability effects. This was necessary in order to ascertain whether
there was a significant probability effect at encoding demonstrated by
these subjects for sequential expectancy to explain. The between-
subjects variables of mapping condition and order of contrast alterna-
tion were not included in the analysis. Results are summarized in
Table 7. There were main effects of contrast (F(l,23) = 44.95,
E < .001, MS
e
= 47,925) and probability (F(l,23) = 77.15, p_ < .001,
MS
e
= 38,687), but their interaction was not significant (F(l,23) =
1.93, p > .10, MS
e
= 5,591). The size of the interaction is virtually
identical to that obtained using the data of all 32 subjects, so this
subset was probably not qualitatively different.
A two (practice) by two (contrast) by eight (sequence) analysis of
variance was performed on the RT data. Results are summrized in Table
8. The effects of practice (F(l,23) = 8.42, p < .01, MS = 8,497),
contrast (F(l,23) = 57.86, p < .001, MS
e
= 64, 751), and sequence
(F(7,161) = 20.00, p_ < .001, MS_
e
= 4,667) were all significant. As in
Experiment 2, it appears that RT decreases as run length increases, and
tends to increase with lag. Sequential effects did not vary with con-
trast (F(7,161) = 1.24, p_ > .10, MS_
e
= 1,963). Ninety-five percent con
fidence intervals were calculated for the contrast effect for each
sequence. While narrower than those in Experiment 2, they still indi-
cated that contrast effects could be larger for sequences that usually
produce incorrect expectancies. The virtual absence of any such trend
does not support this possibility, however.
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TABLE 7
Mean RTs (in msec) of the 24 subjects whose data were
used in the sequential analysis of Experiment 3.
Probability
•05
.45
Low contrast 784 5g?
High contrast 62 4 458
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As in Experiment 2, the evidence is consistent with the lack of a
sequential expectancy effect at encoding, but is weak. Of particular
note in this regard was the failure to observe a significant probability
by contrast interaction. As stated earlier, there may not have been a
probability effect at encoding for sequential expectancies to explain.
Together with the null result of Experiment 2, though, the total absence
of any indication of sequential effects at encoding in the present ex-
periment suggests that the probability effect at encoding does not arise
from sequential expectancies. An alternative to this conclusion and an
experiment that could strengthen (or weaken) it will he discussed in
the next section.
CHAPTER III
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present experiments were conducted in order to further develop
a description of the mechanism by which stimulus probability affects
perceptual encoding. The first experiment was an attempt to provide
strong evidence for the role of an abstract code as a mediator in the
probability mechanism. Its results were inconclusive. The second and
third experiments suggested that the probability effect at encoding
could not be explained in terms of sequential expectancies.
As mentioned, Experiment 1 was designed to test the importance of
the notion of an abstract code as a mediator of the probability effect
at encoding. The observed pattern of results, together with the pos-
sibility that subjects did not follow instructions in the letter condi-
tion, make it difficult to assess the importance of such a code in the
probability mechanism. However, whether the abstract code involved must
differ from a name code is open to question. The only suggestion of a
probability effect at encoding was in the letter condition, in which the
stimulus names would have been very well learned. There was no evidence
of an effect at encoding in the object condition, in which names would
not have been as strongly associated to the stimuli. Furthermore, with
the exception of Miller's (1979) Experiment 4, a probability effect at
encoding has never been demonstrated using anything but alphanumeric
stimuli. The small amount of evidence supporting the importance of
abstract codes, combined with the difficulty in precisely defining them
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(see Miller's Experiments 4 and 6, 1979), suggests that it is unw.se to
abandon the notion of a simple name code as a mediator. In addition,
the absence of a probability effect at encoding in the object condition
of Experiment 1 suggests that a mediating code must be well learned to
be effective, a status that arbitrary abstract codes (such as stimulus
dimensions) are not likely to have.
Experiments 2 and 3 were designed to test the notion that the prob-
ability effect at encoding was a result of sequential expectancy ef-
fects. The probability effect may be a reflection of the fact that
more probable stimuli are repeated and hence expected more often. The
results of the present experiments did not support this explanation.
Although not as unequivocally as might be desired, a probability effect
at encoding was demonstrated in the absence of sequential expectancy
effects there. In similar experiments, Miller and Anbar (1981) demon-
strated the probability effect at encoding in the absence of a more
general expectancy effect there. (Expectancy was induced through the
use of a pretrial cue.) It may now be useful to return to the models
presented in the introduction in order to understand the implications of
these findings.
Mechanisms and Causes of the Probability Effect
The logogen model accounted for the probability effect at encoding
by assuming that the activation thresholds of logogens corresponding to
probable stimuli are lowered. The probability by contrast interaction
follows if it is assumed that the effect of contrast manipulation is on
the rate of evidence accrual. The verification model assumes that con-
trast affects the processing mechanism in two places (sensory memory
and feature analysis) for unexpected stimuli, but only sensory memory
is affected when stimuli are correctly expected. If one assumes that
more probable stimuli are correctly expected more often, the probability
by contrast interaction follows directly.
It should be noted that these are models of the probability effect
at a certain locus, and as such, do not address the issue of how the
effect is generated. One manner in which the latter issue may be
addressed is to look for expectancy effects at encoding to determine
their ability to account for the probability effect there. This was
the method used in Experiments 2 and 3 and by Miller and Anbar (1981).
The conclusion that general or sequential expectancies underlie the
probability effect implies that the mechanism ought to be fairly dynam-
ic. The conclusion that the probability effect is not a result of one
of these factors implies a more static mechanism. There is nothing
inherent in either the logogen or verification model that requires a
conclusion about the degree to which the mechanism is static or dynamic.
For example, one could assume that logogen thresholds were adjusted on a
trial to trial basis, or that the expectancy set of the verification
model remained fixed over trials. The logogen model would then be
dynamic, and the verification model, static. The manner of adjustment
could be assigned in just the opposite way, however, so it should be
clear that these models do not address this issue. Rather, they are
accounts of what might be occurring at encoding to produce a probability
by contrast interaction.
The results of Experiments 2 and 3, together with those of Miller
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and Anbar (1981) suggest that the mechanism which is responsxble for the
probability effect is a static one. A possible candidate for this mech-
anism is a process in which subjects monitor the relatxve frequencies of
stimuli over some period of trials (see Hasher and Zacks, 1979), and
then set their expectancies accordingly, adjusting them little, if at
all, once they are set. This conclusion is consistent with both the
logogen and verification models, as described above.
The previous conclusion should be accepted with caution. An exam-
ination of confidence intervals suggested the possibility that the size
of the contrast effect in Experiments 2 and 3 might have varied with
sequential expectancy, but the experiments lacked sufficient power to
detect the interaction. Confidence intervals obtained by Miller and
Anbar (1981) revealed that this alternative conclusion was also viable
for their study. Under any circumstances, it is unwise to accept a
conclusion based on so few observations of a null result. Furthermore,
Miller and Anbar' s conclusion that expectancy does not underlie the
probability effect may be challenged on other grounds. They conducted
two experiments in which they failed to observe an expectancy by con-
trast interaction. In the first, probability was also manipulated, and
the probability by contrast interaction was observed in the PC data, but
not the RT data. In the second experiment, probability was not manipu-
lated at all. In both experiments, the RT data were examined for the
presence of the expectancy by contrast interaction. The failure to dem-
onstrate a probability by contrast interaction for the RT data leaves
their experiments open to the same criticism that was applied to Experi-
ment 2 of the present study; namely, that it is a questionable practice
to require expectancy effects to explain a probability effect at encod-
ing that may not be present in the data under consideration.
Another potential criticism of Miller and Anbar's study is that
their cuing procedure may have yielded an expectancy effect that is
qualitatively different from that which occurs in a typical choice reac-
tion time task. This is because their pretrial cues were the stimuli
themselves. Subjects may have adopted a strategy of preparing the res-
ponse to the cued stimulus when the cue was presented, and then per-
forming a physical comparison of target to cue when the stimulus was
presented. If there was a match, the prepared response could be
executed purely on the basis of the physical comparison; if not, the
stimulus would have to be identified before a response could be exe-
cuted. Pacheila and Miller (1976) proposed a similar strategy to
account for the absence of a probability effect for physical match
trials in a letter matching task. The critical aspect of this strategy
is that stimulus identification is not necessary when the cue is valid.
However, there is reason to believe that the identification process is
heavily involved in the probability effect at encoding. By using a task
that permits this process to be bypassed when cues are valid (thereby
producing an expectancy effect), Miller and Anbar may have made their
conclusions based on a type of expectancy effect that does not involve
stimulus identification. The possibility remains, however, that expec-
tancy may influence identification in other tasks (i.e., tasks in which
the above strategy is not useful), and in so doing, produce the prob-
ability effect at encoding.
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I^J^lidity^the Additive Factor^M^^
The present experiments, and all of the studies that have manipu-
lated contrast in concluding that probability affects encoding, may be
subjected to a more fundamental criticism than those discussed to this
point. The assumption underlying all of this work is that processing
is conducted by a series of discrete stages and that, while contrast
may affect the rate of processing within the stage or stages responsible
for encoding, the contrast manipulation does not affect the quality of
the output of any stage. That is, given enough time, the quality of
the output for any stage in the low contrast condition will match the
quality for that stage in the high contrast condition. If output is
affected, it is possible that the effects of contrast could be passed
down the line of processing stages, so to speak, and the conclusion
that a manipulation influences an early stage of processing because it
interacts with contrast would not follow.
The assumption that contrast affects only the rate of processing
gains some support from the observation by Pachella and Fisher (1969)
that contrast affected the rate, but not the asymptote, of information
accrual in a discrimination task. However, there is reason to question
the generalizability of this conclusion to the effect of contrast as it
has been manipulated in probability studies. In order to observe con-
trast effects of the size typical of these studies (125 to 250 msec),
the luminance at low contrast must be very low. In the present experi-
ments, the probability by contrast interaction was observed in the data
of roughly 60% of the subjects, and a small number of individuals con-
tributed heavily to its overall magnitude. This suggests the possrbil-
ity that, at least for some subjects, the effect of contrast might have
been on the quality of the output of some process. For these subjects,
it may have been the case that no matter how long they viewed a stimu-
lus, the quality of what they saw never reached the level obtained at
high contrast. Until the effect of contrast as it has been manipulated
in probability studies is shown to be on the rate, and not the asymp-
tote, of information accrual, the additive factors interpretation of
the probability effect on encoding based on the observed probability by
contrast interaction is open to question. Similarly, if one assumes a
continuous flow of information rather than a discrete stage process,
there exists more than one interpretation of a probability by contrast
interaction (McClelland, 1979). Miller (1982) has provided some evi-
dence against this notion, showing that a task similar to those used
in probability studies involved fairly discrete stages. Given the
importance of this assumption, further evidence is desirable.
Probability as a Manipulation of Expectancy in General
In the introduction, it was suggested that stimulus probability
may serve as a model of expectancy effects in general. It is thus
reasonable to ask whether other types of expectancies have exerted
effects at encoding similar to those of probability. In both a lexi-
cal decision and a naming task, Becker and Killion (1977) observed that
the effect of semantic priming varied inversely with contrast.
Stanovich and West (1979) observed a similar result for the effect of a
predictive sentence context in a naming task. The findings that the
effects of other types of expectancy have varied with contrast suggests
that probability is not an isolated instance of some form of expectancy
which is capable of exerting an effect at encoding. The xnterpretatxon
provided by Stanovich and West for their results is noteworthy in this
regard, for it suggests still another interpretation for the probability
by contrast interaction. Stanovich and West used the distinction of
Posner and Snyder (1975) between a fast, automatic spreadxng activation
process and a slower process by which conscious attention is focussed.
Only facilitation results from the first process, while the second
results in both facilitation and inhibition effects. They reasoned that
only the first process occurred under high contrast conditions in their
task, because the interval between context and target was too short to
allow the attentional process to act. The effect of low contrast, then,
was to slow down the early processing of the stimulus so that the con-
scious attention mechanism had time to act. Stanovich and West argued
that anything that increases the interval between the presentation of
context and the target should produce a similar interaction. Thus, con-
trast is equated with all forms of degradation, and the mere passage of
time, under this interpretation. Stanovich and West also manipulated
the time between context and target presentation, and obtained results
consistent with their interpretation.
If the probability mechanism is a dynamic one, then this interpre-
tation of expectancy by contrast interactions would seem to have test-
able predictions. For example, if the expectancies involved in a prob-
ability task arose on a trial to trial basis, the expectancy on trial n
should be different from the expectancy on trial n+1. Given these
shifting expectancies and the Stanovich and West interpretation, the
duration of the intertrial interval (HI) should be an i.portant vari-
able. With short His, the conscious attention mechanism should not
have time to act. While ITI has never been systematically manipulated
in a probability experiment, it has varied across studies, with no dis-
cernable effect on the probability by contrast interaction.
On the other hand, if the probability mechanism is fairly static,
it is not clear how Stanovich and West's interpretation would apply.
That is, it is unclear to what the interval between the arisen expec-
tancy and the onset of a stimulus would correspond, since the expectancy
is presumably constant given a static mechanism. This indirectly
raises the question of the utility of stimulus probability as a model of
expectancy effects in general at encoding. If the probability mechanism
is shown to be static, its utility as a model would be questionable,
since it seems doubtful that more ecologically valid types of expectan-
cies (such as context effects that might arise during reading) are of
such a stable nature. If the probability mechanism is of a fairly dyna-
mic nature, however, it would consequently be much more similar to
other, inherently more interesting, types of expectancies. Given the
vast literature on dynamic expectancies during choice reaction time
tasks, the exact nature of an expectancy at a given point in time could
conceivably be evaluated more precisely than would be possible when
studying more complex forms of expectancy. Thus, a dynamic probability
mechanism could well serve as a basis for developing an explicit model
of the effects of expectancy over time on the perceptual encoding
process
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Future Directions
The potential utility of the probability mechanism as a model of
expectancy effects in general argues for the further investigation of
the issues that have been raised by this and other research regarding
the nature of the probability effect at encoding. In light of the pre-
vious discussion, the foremost question is that of the static versus
dynamic nature of the effect. To the extent that the effect is dynamic,
it should be possible to demonstrate the effect of some form of dynamic
(e.g., sequential) expectancy at encoding. One way of doing this might
be to include runs of only a few set lengths in a trial block. These
run lengths could be chosen such that they would be likely to induce the
largest possible sequential expectancy effect. A mill result in this
case should be difficult to attribute to a lack of power, since it would
accompany the finding of large effects obtained with many observations
per subject. Alternatively, probability might be manipulated, with run
length controlled such that sequential effects would be minimal. If
sequential expectancy underlies the probability effect at encoding, the
prediction would be that a probability by contrast interaction should
not be observable in this situation. A cuing experiment similar to
those of Miller and Anbar (1981) could also demonstrate an expectancy
effect at encoding. The key difference would be to use cues that were
symbolic, and not identical to the target stimuli. The physical compar-
ison strategy discussed earlier would thus not be possible.
A second issue regarding the probability effect is the role of a
name code as a mediator of the effect. Is the appeal to an abstract
code that is more general than a name code necessary? Miller's (1979)
Experiment 4 could be replicated using other stimuli that are seemingly
identifiable using abstract codes. The demand for a code more abstract
than a name ought to be firmly established before the notion of a simple
name code as mediator is abandoned. The importance of a name code might
be firmly established by an experiment similar to the present Experi-
ment 1. Proceeding on the assumption that alphanumeric stimuli must be
used to observe the probability effect at encoding, Hebrew letters might
be used as stimuli, and subjects would be grouped into readers and non-
readers of Hebrew. If the existence of a well learned name code is
critical, the probability by contrast interaction should be observed in
data of the first group, but not the second.
Another issue concerns the validity of additive factors logic in
localizing the probability effect at encoding. An experiment analogous
to that of Pachella and Fisher (1969) is needed to show that the effect
of contrast as manipulated in probability experiments is on the rate,
and not the asymptote, of information accrual. To further support the
validity of the additive factors logic in probability experiments, a
procedure advocated by Meyer and Irwin (1981) might be employed to eval-
uate the nature of the flow of information (continuous versus discrete)
in the task used to observe the probability by contrast interaction.
Finally, the probability effect may be studied with the specific
intent of generalizing the results to other forms of expectancy. For
example, the interpretation offered by Stanovich and West (1979) to
account for expectancy by contrast interactions is very different from
that of Becker (1980; Becker and Killion, 1977). Without going into
details, the former predicts that the interaction should only be
observed in conjunction with an expectancy induced inhibition effect,
while the latter yields the prediction that only facilitation-dominated
expectancy effects should interact with contrast. The comparatively
uncomplicated nature of the probability manipulation may allow insights
regarding expectancy that lead to the resolution of this issue.
In conclusion, the results of the present experiments were not in
favor of the notion of the stimulus probability effect as a general
model of expectancy effects at encoding, since they suggested a static,
rather than a dynamic mechanism. However, a number of reasons for not
accepting this conclusion were offered, and it was suggested that the
potential utility of the probability mechanism as a model warrants fur-
ther investigation of issues pertaining to the nature of the stimulus
probability effect. This course of action could ultimately result in a
fairly precise description of the ongoing effects of expectancy on the
perceptual encoding process.
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